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NOTE
NATIVE VILLAGE OFEYAK V BLANK'
FISH IS BEST RARE;
JUSTICE,NOT SO MUCH

WILLIAMH. HowERYIII*

Treat the earth well: it was not given to you by your parents;
it was loaned to you by your children.2

INTRODUCTION
Archaeological evidence shows the Chugach people began
inhabiting the Copper River Delta and coastal lands along the Prince
William Sound inlet of the Gulf of Alaska when the glaciers of the last
ice age receded.3 The Chugach have always been seafarers who rely
upon the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) for their
INative Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 630 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam),
cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013) (holding non-exclusive
rights to natural resources from aboriginal title never arose because the Villages did not meet their
burden of proof for exclusive use and occupancy; although the Chugach exclusively used all but the
periphery of the claimed areas, they failed to present sufficient evidence of the ability to occupy
those areas to the exclusion of other tribes).
. J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, 2014; M.Ed. Secondary
Education, Northern Arizona University, 2006; B.S. American Political Studies, Northern Arizona
University, 2004. 1 would like to thank Tudor Jones, Alyce Foshee, Ed Baskauskas, and Professors
Alan Ramo and William Gallagher. For their persistent support and assistance drafting, I dedicate
this note to my family: parents Connie and William; siblings ChyAnna, CherKea, and Jonathan; and
wife Cristina. If I've learned anything from it all, it's that you're usually right.
2 Old Cherokee Proverb.
See generally Who We Are: History & Culture, CHUGACH ALASKA CORP. (2012),
http://www.chugach-ak.com/whoweare/cultural/Pages/default.aspx.
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livelihood.4 First contact 5 with a major European imperial power came
when Russian explorers met the Chugach in Umiaks several miles from
land.6 Regular contact came when the Russian American Company
established a trading post at Nuchek to supply European and Asian fur
markets. The furs of the area's sea mammals were commercially in
high demand, but the Russians recognized the Chugach as formidable
foes. Consequently, the Russians did not subjugate the Chugach, as
they had done to other, larger tribes in Alaska, but traded for the prized
natural resources found in their waters. 9

4
"Indeed, their very occupancy on the shore and immemorial enjoyment of sea and seabed
are testament to the variety of marine mammals, fish, and sea birds in that area. These resources
ensured a more certain livelihood than the inland hunt of moose and caribou could provide. The
villages formed at the water's edge." David J. Bloch, Colonizing the Last Frontier,29 AM. INDIAN
L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2004).
5The district court noted, "Vitus Bering probably landed on Kayak Island in 1741. He had
no meaningful contact with the indigenous people." Native Vill. of Eyak v. Locke, No. 3:98-cv0365-HRH, at 12 n.22 (D. Alaska August 7, 2009).
6 The district court also found the Chugach were capable of navigating anywhere within the
Prince William Sound and past, from the Lower Kenai Peninsula to the Copper River Flats, out to
Kodiak, Middleton, and the Barren Islands, and past Wessels Reef in kayaks and umiaks. A kayak
was an "enclosed vessel made of a light wooden frame entirely covered with mammal skins and
traditionally constructed to accommodate two people as well as gear and food[,]" and an umiak,
"also constructed with a wooden frame and mammal skins, was an open vessel, much larger than a
kayak, capable of carrying many people and considerable cargo." Id. at 15. The earliest European
sources cited by anthropologists testifying in this case at the trial level stated groups of the Chugach
Sugpiat "traveled immense distances across open water in their skin-covered boats. Sauer 1802
specifically stated that two kayakers paddled three miles out to his ship." Patricia H. Partnow,
Ph.D., Comments on Anthropological Source Documents, Expert Report Affidavit, Eyak v. Locke,
No. 3:98-cv-0365-HRH (D. Alaska August 7, 2009). Further, "the Chugach introduced records of
five eyewitness accounts from 18th-century explorers describing encounters with seafaring Chugach
on the OCS more than three miles from shore." Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 630
(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S.
Ct. 51 (2013) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
The Company forced males between the ages of eighteen and fifty to work for three years.
The Chugach People, CORDOVA HISTORICAL MUSEUM, http://cordovamuseum.org/history/peopleof-the-region (last visited March 1, 2014).
"The Russians had virtually enslaved other Alutiiq people as well as the Koniag.... The
Chugach were recognized by the Russians as potentially formidable foes, and apparently chose to
work and trade with the Chugach rather than attempting to dominate them." Eyak v. Locke, at 16
n.27.
Bloch, supra note 5, at 6 ("Historically, whales were prized by tribal members for their
blubber, meat, and oil. Sea lions, porpoises, smaller whales, and seals would be harpooned in open
water from skin-covered kayaks. Seal hunting additionally required the use of decoys, nets, and
ambuscade. The furs of sea otters were highly valued. Bottom fish like cod, halibut, and rockfish,
harvested from deep water with baited hooks and lures, were a staple of subsistence commensurate
to the mammals. As travel between villages was frequent and typically by water (in umiaks as well
as kayaks), extensive trade and ceremonial exchange of the sea's riches developed. . . . [T]he
traditions associated with life, love, religion, and death came to depend on the ocean and its

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss1/8

2

Howery: Eyak: Aboriginal Rights & Federal Parmountcy

2014]

Eyak: Aboriginal Rights & FederalParamountcy

49

The Chugach continued trade with the Russian Empire until
Alaska was purchased by the United States in 1867.10 The Klondike
Gold Strike in 1896 brought a significant population of mineral
prospectors into the area. The Chugach population declined as each
natural resource was exploited." Direct American subjugation began
with Bureau of Indian Affairs school policies against Chugach language
and culture. Acculturation peaked with the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, which altered the very entity of an
Indian tribe in order to extinguish land claims and protect America's
most expensive and indispensable resource, oil.12 Subsequently, other
natural resources within Chugach territory at times became cause for
controversy.' 3 Thus the Chugach, like most other Alaskan natives, are
resources. A majority of village members today continue the subsistence lifestyle of their
forbears. . . .").
Io Following the Civil War, Secretary of State William H. Seward's "folly"
eventually
provided the United States with an abundance of minerals, petroleum, and natural resources (at issue
in this case) for the purchase price of $7.2 million, or roughly 2 cents per acre. For an account of the
deal, see generally Univ. of Rochester Library Bulletin: Spring 1967, SEWARD'S FOLLY: A SON'S
VIEW, http://www.lib.rochester.edu/index.cfm?PAGE=487 (reprinting a speech given many times by
Seward's sons Frederick Seward and William H. Seward, Jr., Address at the Alaska-Yukon
Exposition in Seattle (Sept. 10, 1909)) (last visited March 1, 2014).
"The wider territory of the Alutiiq, or Chugach Eskimo people-historically also called
Aleut and Sugpiaq-includes the Alaska Peninsula, parts of the Kenai Peninsula, and Kodiak
Island.. [which] were hit especially hard by events of the early 20th century. They were displaced
from their lands and nearly destroyed by the discovery of oil at Katalla, the settlement of Cordova in
1909, and the building of the Copper River & Northwestern Railroad between Cordova and the
Kennecott copper mines (completed in 1911). The Eyak population, estimated at 300-400 in the late
19th century, dwindled to fewer than 40 by the 1930s." LaRue Bames, Eyak and Alutiiq (Chugach
Eskimo): Indigenous Peoples of the Copper River Delta and Prince William Sound, ALASKA NATIVE
COLLECTIONS: SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, http://alaska.si.edu/culture-eyak.asp?continue=1 (last

visited March 1, 2014).
12The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) establishes the Alaska Native Fund,
more than $962,500,000 from appropriations and mineral lease payments, for the Natives' aboriginal
land claims as well as forty million acres of land as compensation. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 398 (2004). "To administer the property and money, the

Act authorizes the creation of twelve regional corporations which are to correspond to the areas
inhabited by the various Native groups. . . . The statute . .. sets forth the procedure for determining
the boundaries of the twelve regions. 'For purposes of this chapter, the State of Alaska shall be
divided by the Secretary of the Interior within one year after December 18, 1971, into twelve
geographic regions, with each region composed as far as practicable of Natives having a common
heritage and sharing common interests. . . .' Cent. Council of Tlingit & Haida Indians of Alaska v.
Chugach Native Ass'n, 502 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a)). More
than two hundred village corporations were also created. For an overview of these "tribes of
shareholders,"

see

GARY

C.

ANDERS

&

KATHLEEN

ANDERS,

INCOMPATIBLE

GOALS

IN

UNCONVENTIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS OF ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS (1986),

reprinted in DEVELOPING AMERICA'S NORTHERN FRONTIER

133 (Theodore Lane ed.,

1987)

available at www.alaskool.org/projects/ancsa/t lane/IncompatibleGoals.htm.
13The Chugach corporations are no strangers to litigation, especially in the Ninth Circuit.
See Chugach Alaska Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that Native
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now an impoverished group with limited economic resources or
commercial enterprises.14
For the purposes of the litigation discussed in this Note, the
Chugach peoples comprise five native villages in the State of Alaska:
Eyak, Tatitlek, Chenega, Nanwalek, and Port Graham ("the Villages"). 15
The Villages must fight for a right to the natural resource they depend
upon most for survival, fish. At the end of the twentieth century, the
Villages sued the federal government to assert claims of aboriginal title,
and along with it, exclusive rights to the resources of their ancestral
fishing grounds on the OCS. A panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held the federal paramountcy doctrine' 6
barred any exclusive claim based upon aboriginal title.17 Thus, the
United States exclusively controls access to the Villages' ancestral
fishing grounds.
This Note discusses the recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in
Native Village of Eyak v. Blank, in which the five native Villages sued to
assert non-exclusive rights to resources under aboriginal title claims; the
Villages lost. 18 Part I explains the legal background, from the
American corporation could retain sufficient quantity of assigned income in order to avoid paying
any alternative minimum tax); Chugach Alaska Corp. v. Lujan, 915 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that members enrolled in another village do not qualify as members of the group regardless
of residence for conveyance of public land); Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723
(9th Cir. 1978) (holding that sand and gravel are part of the subsurface estate, and therefore revenues
from extraction belong to regional corporation).
14,Today, approximately one fifth of the inhabitants of Alaska are Natives. Many Natives
continue to live a traditional lifestyle. As a group, Alaska Natives have the lowest incomes in the
state, and a Native family is three times more likely to live under the federal poverty line than a nonNative family. A report issued in 2009 found that the unemployment rate for Alaska Natives was
five times higher than the national average." STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND

TRIBES 261 (2012).
Chenega is also known as Chanega, while Nanwalek was formerly known as English Bay.
Native Vill. of Eyak v. Locke, No. 3:98-cv-0365-HRH, at I n.l (D. Alaska August 7, 2009).
The federal paramountcy doctrine states: "The Constitution allotted to the federal
government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense so that as
attributes of these external sovereign powers, it has paramount rights in the contested areas of the
sea." Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
i7"They seek exclusive use of the ocean resources and regulatory power over third parties,
including officials of our executive branch of government, subject only to the laws of Congress. ...
[Insofar as the] Native Villages' claim to complete control over the OCS is contrary to these national
interests and inconsistent with their position as a subordinate entity within our constitutional
scheme ... the Native Villages are barred from asserting exclusive rights to the use and occupancy
of the OCS based on unextinguished aboriginal title." Id. at 1096-97.
1 Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 626 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam),
cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013) (holding that native
villages did not satisfy their burden to prove exclusive use and occupancy of claimed areas of the
OCS to establish aboriginal title).
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underpinnings of American Indian sovereignty and claims of aboriginal
title, to the federal paramountcy doctrine. Part II explains the litigious
path discussing the holdings of the Chugach cases from the first Ninth
Circuit decision of Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie to the

current decision of Eyak v. Blank. It describes the findings of the district
court in Native Village of Eyak v. Locke following the en banc remand
ordering those findings in Native Village of Eyak v. Daley. Then it

contrasts the majority holding of the Ninth Circuit with Judge Fletcher's
dissent and the language debate amidst the panel. The Ninth Circuit
refused to acknowledge the existence of aboriginal title over the fishing
grounds used by the Villages since time immemorial. Part III argues that
the Ninth Circuit en banc added a new prerequisite that a tribe must
establish before the courts will acknowledge rights claimed under
aboriginal title. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit created a split between
circuits. 9 The majority avoided the greater legal question of whether
these non-exclusive rights to the natural resources of the OCS conflict
with the federal paramountcy doctrine, a question that the dissent
analyzed correctly.
By denying commercial rights, this holding
guarantees Indian tribes only subsistence fishing, attacking tribal
sovereignty.
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Constitution of the United States grants Congress the sole
power to regulate affairs with Indian tribes. 20 Using the doctrine of
discovery as Chief Justice John Marshall announced in Johnson v.
M'Intosh, the established legal principle of American conquest remains:
Humanity, however, acting on public opinion, has established, as a
general rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, that
that their condition shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the
objects of conquest.. .. [Hjumanity demands, and a wise policy
requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain

unimpaired;that the new subjects should be governed as equitably as
the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually banish

9 See Wichita Indian Tribe v. United States, 696 F.2d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that evidence must be "specific enough to justify a finding of a lack of exclusive use").
20"The Congress shall have the power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 3.
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the painful sense of being separated from their ancient connexions,
and united by force to strangers.21
The original tribal inhabitants' right to title under American law was
restricted only to that of an occupier by their status as domestic
dependent nations.2 2 Tribes may claim only aboriginal title under the
jurisdiction of the United States, which asserts ultimate sovereignty.
A.

ABORIGINAL TITLE

Aboriginal title, a possessory interest otherwise known as original
title, Indian title, or the Indian right of occupancy,23 is a specific land-use
right possessed by a tribe 24 or an individual tribal member. 25 Many
countries today with a judiciary descending from the English commonlaw tradition apply Chief Justice Marshall's American aboriginal title
doctrine to claims regarding title to lands occupied by native peoples.2 6
The first Congress of the United States passed the Indian NonIntercourse Act. This legislation protects Indian lands by establishing
that only the federal government, but neither states nor private citizens,
could acquire land from an Indian tribe. 27 It was up to the Supreme
Court to define the legal rights and title Indian tribes held, 28 as well as

21Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 589 (1823) (emphasis added).

22Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 1, 2 (1831) (finding Indian nations to be
domestic dependent nations with limited sovereignty).
23The original inhabitants of the United States have the right to continue to occupy and use
their ancestral land until Congress decides to extinguish this possessory interest for another purpose.
PEVAR, supra note 15, at 24.
24Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974).
25United States v. Dann, 873 F.2d 1189, 1195-96 (9th Cir. 1989).
26Originally, Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland divided colonial lands into
two categories: (1) Unoccupied land, or vacant and uncultivated lands that could be acquired by
mere occupancy, and (2) Occupied land, or lands cultivated and populated by native peoples that
could be acquired by conquest, cession, or purchase by a sovereign. By the time Chief Justice John
Marshall established the aboriginal title doctrine, while authoring Johnson v. MIntosh, 21 U.S. (8
Wheat) 543, and the Cherokee Cases, most notably Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters)
1, and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Peters) 515 (1832), inconsistent holdings across the
common-law world were in conflict over whether property rights remained intact following a change
in sovereignty bringing about the new Anglo legal system. BRIAN SLATTERY, ANCESTRAL LANDS,
ALIEN LAWS: JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON ABORIGINAL TITLE 4-5, 8, 10, 15 (1983).

27"[N]o sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the
United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether having the right of
pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be made and duly executed at some public
treaty, held under the authority of the United States." Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, §4,
1 Stat. 137, 138 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 1753 (1983)).
28 CANBY, supra note 13, at
368.
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the status of the tribes living within the expanding borders of the United
States.
The "doctrine of discovery" 29 was articulated in the seminal case
Johnson v. M'Intosh. In 1773, Johnson purchased land from the
Piankeshaw Indians in what is today the State of Illinois. In 1818,
M'Intosh purchased the same land from the United States. 30 A
unanimous Court decided that discovery necessarily limited tribal
sovereignty, removing the property right of alienation, and giving
exclusive title to the discovering sovereign, subject only to the Indian
right of occupancy. 3 1 However, only the United States could eliminate
the Indian right of occupancy by purchase or conquest. 3 2 Thus, the title
Johnson purchased, and consequently the title his successors claimed,
was Indian title with no ownership right, only a possessory right akin to
that of the Indians. This title was inferior to fee simple title issued by the
United States. 3 3 Chief Justice Marshall later clarified the legal status of
Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" that continued to retain a
limited sovereignty subservient only to that of the United States, but not
subject to the sovereignty to the several states. 34
Successive courts affirmed that only the federal government can
extinguish aboriginal title, which need not be based upon treaty, statute,
or formal government action in order to exist.
Only Congress may
extinguish such title and must do so explicitly.3 6 Because aboriginal title
29The "Doctrine of Discovery" continues to be criticized across the common-law
world as
religious zealotry and racism. "During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Christian nations of
Europe espoused the view that non-Christian lands throughout the world could be claimed by
Christians as a matter of divine right, and they used the Doctrine of Discovery to dominate
indigenous peoples and to dispossess them of their lands and assets. The Doctrine of Discovery is
the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and colonialism directed against non-Western peoples.
Indigenous people around the world, including those in the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia, had their lands confiscated based on this theory." PEVAR, supra note 15, at 24 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
30 Johnson v. M Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 560-62.
31Id. at 574.
32Id. at 587.

at 584, 603-04.
34As Domestic Dependent Nations, or wards of the guardian United States, and not foreign
nations, tribes like the Cherokee had no standing to sue states in the Supreme Court, which lacked
original jurisdiction. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Peters) 1, 12-13, 17 (1831).
The federal government's policy is to respect the Indian right of occupancy, "considered as
sacred as the fee simple of the whites." Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669
(1974) (quoting Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Peters) 711, 746 (1835)).
The United States must prove title was extinguished "by treaty, by the sword, by purchase,
by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise," Congress
having the supreme power to do so. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347
(1941).
3 ,Id.
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is not a property right, but a tribal possessory interest, the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause does not protect it. 3 7 The United States
retains the fee under aboriginal title; however, the occupied land and all
connected resources are rightful tribal possessions. 38
For the first century and a half of United States existence, tribes
were substantially disadvantaged in dealings, treaties, and court
proceedings. Following the Second World War, and the inception of
citizenship for Indians, came a renaissance of rights. From 1946 to 1978,
Congress established the Indian Claims Commission, waiving sovereign
immunity to settle aboriginal title, takings, and treaty claims; jurisdiction
to review Commission decisions was vested in the Court of Claims. 39
The principle was established that aboriginal title continues until
extinguishment; furthermore, the intent to extinguish aboriginal title
must be plain and unambiguous. 4 0 Explicit statutory action is not
necessary to extinguish aboriginal title for an individual tribe or even an
entire state.41
B.

EXTINGUISHMENT OF ABORIGINAL TITLE IN ALASKA

Alaskan tribes are at a disadvantage because the practice of
entering into formal treaties with Indian tribes ended shortly after
Alaska's purchase from Russia in 1867.42 Courts have held that tribes
retain sovereignty with or without a treaty. Alaska Natives, unlike other
Indian tribes, have been placed in a unique system. Under the
Commerce Clause, only Congress may legislate for the Indian tribes,

Aboriginal title may be extinguished without right of just compensation. Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1955).
3 United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation, 304 U.S. 111, 11718(1938).
39CANBY, Supra note 13, at 378-81 (explaining the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946,
25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70v.).
40 Lipan Apache Tribe v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 487, 492-93 (1967).
41Several actions of the United States, absent congressional statute, can result in the
extinguishment of aboriginal title, including treaty or agreement, see Otoe & Missouria Tribe v.
United States, 131 Ct. Cl. 593 (1955); the creation of a reservation, see Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Cmty. v. United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 137 (1974); settlement, see Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S. 513
(1852); adverse governmental action, see Tlingit & Haida Indians v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 315
(1959); or intent to use the area and resources otherwise, see United States v. Gemmill, 535 F2d
1145 (9th Cir. 1976).
42 "No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged
or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract
by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired." 25 U.S.C.A. § 71 (Westlaw
2014).
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which are domestic dependent nations that still retain sovereignty greater
than that of the several states.43 Congress extinguished all claims of
aboriginal title within the State of Alaska in 197 1.44 As a result, village
and regional corporations now hold assets unlike the tribal entities
recognized in other states.45 All Alaskan natives alive on December 18,
1971, became shareholders of their respective corporations and were
prohibited from selling their shares for twenty years.46 Coincidentally, at
the same time shareholders were able to sell shares, the Chugach
Corporation filed Chapter Eleven bankruptcy; the extinguishment of
aboriginal title and entity of tribe came with such consequences.
C.

CURRENT LEGAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING ABORIGINAL TITLE

Today, Indian tribes continue a government-to-government
relationship of general trust with the United States, which owes
something akin to a fiduciary duty toward its dependent nations.4 7 Under
the Constitution of the United States, Congress has plenary authority
over all tribes pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 4 8 Sovereignty of tribes
is reserved, much like the Tenth Amendment for the states, under the

43Upon admission to the Union, later states recognized the "establishment and sanctity of the
nation-to-nation relationship between tribes and the federal government," DAVID E. WILKINS & K.
TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW

202 (2001), as Alaska did pursuant to the Alaska Statehood Act, "forever disclaim[ing] all right and
title to any lands or other property . .. the right and title to which may be held by any Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts . . . under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the United States." Act of July
7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, §4, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958).
443 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b) (Westlaw 2014); Amoco Production Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 536-37 (1987).
45 Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520, 533 (1998) (holding that corporations can
transfer land out of Native ownership without restrictions on alienation negating independent
sovereignty).
4643 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq. (Westlaw 2014); ANCSA defines "Native" as a citizen of the
United States who is a person of one-fourth degree or more Alaska Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut blood,
or combination thereof. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1602(b) (Westlaw 2014). Shareholders may now sell their
interests to anyone at any time. Unlike in other tribes, children of shareholders may never receive
any interest in their native corporations. See PEVAR, supra note 15, at 261.
47 "This Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the
Government and its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people. . . . [T]he
Government is something more than a contracting party. Under a humane and self-imposed policy
which has found expression in many acts of Congress, and numerous decisions of this Court, it has
charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed
in the acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the
most exacting fiduciary standards." Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
48 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 44, at 115 (stating the Supreme Court recognizes
Congress as having "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, and unqualified authority over tribes
and individual Indians" (citing Mashunkashey v. Mashunhashey, 134 P.2d 976, 979 (Okla. 1943))).
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Supremacy Clause. 4 9 Because of the government's superior position,
federal courts apply three canons of construction to interpret treaties: 1)
to resolve ambiguities in favor of Indians, 2) to interpret treaties as the
Indians would have understood them, and 3) to liberally construe any
treaty in favor of the tribe.50 Treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on
lands tribes ceded to the United States have been consistently upheld
when treaties are present. These rights have also been found to exist
without treaties when aboriginal title has not clearly been extinguished. '
Other legal standards have been created in order to assist tribes
litigating against the awesome power of the United States. Because of
the difficulty in obtaining evidence clearly establishing aboriginal title,
courts must adopt a liberal approach in favor of tribal claimants.52 When
establishing aboriginal title, ambiguities in a treaty between a tribe and
the United States should be construed in favor of the tribe, because the
tribe itself is a ward of the United StateS. 53 The Sac & Fox test is used
(as it was in Eyak v. Blank) to determine the existence of aboriginal
title.54 This test defines aboriginal title as actual, exclusive, and
continuous use and occupancy for a long time, 5 with use and occupancy
determined by the way of life, habits, customs and usage of the users and

occupiers. 5 6
More recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld aboriginal title for an
Alaskan tribe in People of the Village of Gambell v. Hodel. In Gambell
v. Hodel, the Secretary of the Interior issued leases to explore parts of the
OCS off the coast of Alaska to explore the possibility of oil and gas
49WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 44, at 122 ("treaty in truth and in fact merely
reserved and preserved inviolate to the Indians the fishing rights which from time immemorial they
had always had and enjoyed" (emphasis added) (quoting Makah Indian Tribe v. McCauly, 39 F.
Supp. 75 (W.D. Wash. 1941), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. McCauley v. Makah Indian Tribe,
128 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1942))).
5oWILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 44, at 141.

51Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 182-86 (1999).
52
Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 627-29 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting) (stating that courts must take a common-sense approach when evaluating exclusivity,
because it is extremely difficult to establish facts after the lapse of time, and exclusivity can be
inferred from a date too remote to admit testimony of a living witness (citing Muckleshoot Tribe v.
United States, 3 Ind. Cl. Comm. 669, 677 (1955); Snake or Piute Indians v. United States, 112 F.
Supp. 543, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1953))).
s3 Because a tribe is a ward of the nation, dependent upon the protection and good faith of the
federal government, doubtful expressions in a treaty with the tribe must be resolved in favor of the
weak and defenseless people of the tribe. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 354
(1941).
5 Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 622.
ss Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
56 Id.
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extraction.
In order to preserve their subsistence fishing rights, the
Villages of Gambell and Stebbins sought an injunction to prevent named
defendants Amoco, Arco, Exxon, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, Sohio Alaska
Petroleum, and Union Oil Company of California from executing the
leases.58 The district court held there were no aboriginal rights in the
OCS, based upon the holding of Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope v.
United States. 59 The Ninth Circuit overturned that decision. In doing so,
the court of appeals acknowledged the Villages had aboriginal
subsistence rights to fish and prevented the execution of the leases in
order to prevent depletion of the fishery the tribe relied upon for survival.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit determined that ANCSA does not
extinguish aboriginal subsistence rights in the OCS, as it is not part of the
State of Alaska,60 and the federal paramountcy doctrine does not
extinguish aboriginal rights but merely subordinates them. 6 1
In addition, subsistence rights of all rural Alaskans, native and nonnative, are protected within state boundaries. Passed in 1980, the Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) prioritizes hunting
and fishing on public lands in the State of Alaska to guarantee
subsistence rights to inhabitants of rural areas. 6 2 "ANILCA creates a
board that determines for each village (based on that village's 'customary
and traditional' hunting and fishing practices) the number of fish and
wildlife the village may take within its assigned hunting area." 63
D.

FEDERAL PARAMOUNTCY DOCTRINE

In this country, rights over ocean resources belong to the supreme
sovereign, the United States of America. These rights stand paramount

5 People of the Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1989).
ss Id.
s9 In Inupiat Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982),
aff'd on other grounds, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984), the Natives sought to enjoin similar leases, but
also claimed sovereignty over adjacent waters, rejecting recognition of any and all federal and state
jurisdiction over the tribe. See also Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d at 1275-77.
"oId. at 1280.
61"That aboriginal rights may exist concurrently with a paramount federal interest, without
undermining that interest, is clearly expressed in Cnty, of Oneida N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470
U.S. at 233-36. It has been settled United States policy that federal sovereignty is 'subject to' the
Indians' right of occupancy. See Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (1923); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586 (1823)." Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d at 1277.
6216 U.S.C.A. § 3101 et seq. (Westlaw 2014). Under ANILCA, Alaska regulates hunting
and fishing with federal oversight, providing a preference for subsistence use, which restricts
competing uses when natural resources are insufficient. CANBY, supra note 13, at 422-23.
63 PEVAR, supra note 15, at 263.
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over the rights of all other sovereigns. 64 The Federal Paramountcy
Doctrine was created as a result of four cases in which states asserted
ownership of petroleum resources found under the sea adjacent to their
Under the Constitution, the federal government has
territories.
paramount rights to the natural resources of, and exerts jurisdiction over,
the marginal sea surrounding the country.6 6
In 1947, the United States Supreme Court held that California
could not authorize leases for petroleum, gas, and mineral deposits in the
Pacific Ocean; the Court rejected California's argument that it possessed
title to submerged lands under a three-mile belt of navigable waters, as it
was admitted to the Union on equal footing as the original thirteen
states. 67 Three years later, the Court held that Louisiana could not assert
title to the seabed under a twenty-seven-mile belt into the Gulf of
Mexico, although it exercised dominion over that area before admission
into the Union.68 In the very next case, the Supreme Court stated that
upon admission into the Union, Texas as a republic ceded both
imperium, or sovereignty, and dominium, or ownership, to the United
States in order to become the State of Texas. 69 By the time Maine
asserted sovereign rights over the seabed, the Supreme Court clearly
established the rule: "[T]he Constitution . . . allotted to the federal

government jurisdiction over foreign commerce, foreign affairs and
national defense and . .. the federal government has paramount rights in
the marginal sea."7 0 Coastal states today retain sovereignty for a threemile belt along the coast only because Congress has ceded jurisdiction. 1

California is not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and the federal
government rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to
which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil. United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
65 Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090, 1092
(9th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
66 Id. at 1094.
67 California claimed a three-mile zone from the low water mark extending outward
from the
coast into the Pacific Ocean. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
68 Louisiana claimed a twenty-seven-mile boundary extending from the coast into
the Gulf of
Mexico. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).
Texas claimed the entire continental shelf underneath the Gulf of Mexico. United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-20 (1950).
70 United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 522-23 (1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Maine was joined by several states on the Eastern Seaboard to clarify the extent of state jurisdiction.
Id. at 516.
71 Following the previous paramountcy rulings, Congress passed the Submerged
Lands Act
of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315, and Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-1356, which together provide state jurisdiction from the low water mark to three miles from
shore and federal jurisdiction from three to two hundred miles from the coast. Coincidentally, due to
6

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss1/8

12

Howery: Eyak: Aboriginal Rights & Federal Parmountcy

2014]
1I.

Eyak: AboriginalRights & FederalParamountcy

59

LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT LITIGATION

The natural resources of all submerged lands lying seaward of state
waters, from three to 200 miles off the coast, are subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States.72 Exclusive authority to regulate
management of fisheries of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for two
hundred miles off the coastline was established under the Magnuson
Act.73 Power to regulate fisheries located within the established
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) is
delegated to the Secretary of the Department of Commerce. 74 In 1982,
Congress passed the Northern Pacific Halibut Act;75 thereafter the
Secretary regulated fisheries, limiting fishing of both halibut and
sablefish (black cod).
The Secretary issues Individual Fishing Quota
(IFQ) permits to commercial fishers under the authority granted by
Congress to promulgate regulations pursuant to these acts. 7 In 1993,
commercial fishing was defined as "fishing the resulting catch of which
either is, or is intended to be, sold or bartered."7 8 Commercial fishers
were issued IFQ permits stating a bag limit showing total allowable catch
for each fishing vessel. 79 Also sport fishing, the category under which
subsistence fishing now fell, was defined as "anything other than
commercial fishing."80 Sport fishing was limited to use of a single line
with two hooks for a bag limit of no more than two fish per person per

the curvature of the Earth, three miles outward is the farthest linear point on the horizon that a
person of average height can see while standing on the beach at the low water mark.
7243 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Westlaw 2014). With the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act of
1953 (OSCLA), 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq., Congress affirmed the 1945 Truman Proclamation claiming
sovereign rights over the resources of the continental shelf adjacent to the United States for the
purpose of creating a national underwater buffer zone at the advent of the Cold War.
7 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811(a) (Westlaw 2014). The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., creates a fishery conservation zone. The harvest
of sablefish, or black cod, within the EEZ is regulated solely by this act.
74 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (Westlaw 2014).
7516 U.S.C.A. §§ 773-773k (Westlaw 2014).
76Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
n 16 U.S.C.A. § 773 et seq. (Westlaw 2014). In order to implement the Convention between
the United States and Canada for the Preservation of Halibut in the North Pacific, a joint
International Pacific Halibut Commission was established to recommend regulations to each
country.
78 See former 50 C.F.R. §301.2.
79Seeformer 50 C.F.R. §676.10.
80 See former 50 C.F.R. § 301.17. Today, sport fishing means, "all fishing other than
commercial fishing and treaty Indian ceremonial and subsistence fishing; and (2) In waters in and off
Alaska, all fishing other than commercial fishing and subsistence fishing." 50 C.F.R. § 300.61
(Westlaw 2014).
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day during halibut season, running from February 1 to December 31 each
year.8 ' Commercial fishing for sablefish is divided between 80% deep
hook and line gear and 20% trawler gear. The Department of Commerce
found no significant sustenance fishing or sports fishing existed at the
depth sablefish swim and classified sablefish as a prohibited species. 82
A.

THE BEGINNING OF THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY

This controversy began in 1995 when the Native Village of Eyak
sued the operator of the fishing vessel "MISTER BIG" and the Secretary,
seeking an injunction against trespassers within their traditional native
fishing grounds on the OCS. 83 When the Secretary promulgated
regulations for the management of halibut and sablefish fisheries,
pursuant to the Halibut Act, Magnuson Act, and Convention between the
United States and Canada for the Preservation of Halibut in the North
Pacific, the call for conservation necessitated limited fishing in the Gulf
of Alaska, to control the "race for fish." 84 The Villages claimed that for
over seven thousand years the Chugach had fished and hunted marine
animals in areas of the OCS now regulated by the Secretary of
Commerce.85 In addition, the Villages argued that many of their
fishermen used their boats to clean up Prince William Sound following
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, which prevented them from qualifying
for IFQ permits issued by the Secretary. 86 IFQ permits were issued only
to qualified applicants with sufficient documentation to calculate IFQ
allocation. 87 Therefore, vessels without catch information for the years

81 See jbrmer

50 C.F.R. § 301.21.
50 C.F.R. §679.21 (Westlaw 2014).
83
Opening Brief of Appellants at 10, Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154
F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003
(1999), 1998 WL 34103666.
84Opening Brief of Appellee at 8, Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090, 1997 WL
33550165.
85 Andrew P. Richards, Case Comment, Aboriginal Title or the Paramountcy Doctrine?
Johnson v. McIntosh Flounders in Federal Waters off Alaska in Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler
Diane Marie, Inc., 78 WASH. L. REV. 939, 939 (2003).
86 Opening Brief of Appellants at 9, Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090, 1998 WL
34103666. Further, on "March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez, a tanker sailing across Prince William
Sound from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System terminus in Valdez, Alaska, and bound for Long
Beach, California, struck Bligh Reef fewer than 20 miles from Cordova, spilling almost II million
gallons of crude." D.S. Pensley, Existence and Persistence: Preserving Subsistence in Cordova,
Alaska, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10366, 10368 (Apr. 2012).
8 IFQ Permits were initially allocated following October 18, 1994, to qualified persons.
Qualified persons needed to submit documentation showing harvest of halibut or sablefish with fixed
gear from a vessel during the qualifying years of 1988, 1989, and 1990. Applicants with insufficient
82 See
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1988, 1989, and 1990 were not qualified to receive IFQ permits to
commercially fish halibut or sablefish.
Shortly after filing, the Secretary moved for summary judgment
arguing, inter alia, that 1) the Villages' claims conflicted with federal
paramountcy in the OCS, 2) no treaty or statute recognized an exclusive
right to the OCS, and 3) the statute of limitations for claims barred suit.
On June 17, 1997, the district court granted summary judgment and
dismissed the Villages' claims, holding that exclusive rights to OCS
resources cannot be based on aboriginal title alone and that the federal
paramountcy doctrine barred claims of exclusive aboriginal right. 88
B.

NATIVE VILLAGE OFEYAK V. TRAWLER DIANE MARIE, INC.,

154 F.3D

1090 (9TH CIR. 1998).
The Villages appealed, arguing that only Congress, with its
exclusive plenary power over Indian affairs, not the executive or the
judiciary, could interfere with aboriginal rights.
The academic
community supported the Villages' argument, pointing out that fee
simple title is unlike aboriginal title: the United States asserts dominion
and retains the fee, which includes the right to alienate lands held in
aboriginal title. However, federal dominion remains subject to the use
and occupancy by the tribes. 8 9 Further, aboriginal title is not precluded
by federal paramountcy, but relies upon federal sovereignty in order to
exist. 90 The Villages relied upon Ninth Circuit precedent that aboriginal
rights may exist concurrently with paramount federal interests, without
undermining those interests, because it is "settled United States policy
that federal sovereignty is 'subject to' the Indians' right of occupancy." 9 1
On September 9, 1998, a panel of the Ninth Circuit released the
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie decision, which held that any claims of
information were allowed one opportunity to provide corroborating information within ninety days
of notification. 50 C.F.R. 679.40 (Westlaw 2014).
8 Opening Brief of Appellee at 5, Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d, 1997 WL
33550165.
89"While the Native Villages retain their age-old right to hunt and fish in the waters that
have sustained their people and their culture from time immemorial, the United States has broad
authority to manage and even extinguish these tribal rights." Brief of Amici Curiae Indian Law
Academics in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090,
2003 WL 23650258.
90
Reply Brief of Appellants at 7, Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090, 1998 WL
34103665.
9 People of the Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 227 (1923), superseded by statute, Taylor Grazing Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482. 48 Stat. 127 1, as recognized in United States v. Dann, 865 F.2d 1528 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
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aboriginal title asserting exclusive hunting and fishing rights to the OCS
would automatically be barred by the federal paramountcy doctrine. 9 2
The court likened the Villages' claim to those of the states in the federal
paramountcy cases. 9 3 As separate sovereigns, the states relinquished
interests in the sea upon statehood to the federal government, allotting
the United States jurisdiction over the use, disposition, management, and
control of all property lying seaward of the low water mark. 9 4 "Even
though Indian tribes existed and governed North America before the
United States came into existence, the same is true of the original
states." 9 5
The Villages argued that federal sovereignty is subject to Indian
right of occupancy until unequivocally extinguished by Congress. 96
However, the court agreed with the Secretary's argument that any
exclusive claim of right or title, even aboriginal title, by any sovereign
other than the United States, including an Indian tribe, is repugnant to the
federal paramountcy doctrine. 97 The court reasoned that the Villages'
claim for exclusive use of the OCS included predominant power over
officials of the executive branch, to which Congress delegated the power
to regulate fisheries in the OCS.98 "The Native Villages' claim to
complete control over the OCS is contrary to these [paramount] national
interests and inconsistent with their position as a subordinate entity
within our constitutional scheme." 99 The Supreme Court denied the
Villages' petition for writ of certiorari on June 14, 1999.00

Held

afterward, the federal paramountcy doctrine barred claims of aboriginal
title to exclusive rights to use and occupancy of the OCS. Thus, the
Villages tried to assert non-exclusive rights.

92Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1998).

The four federal paramountcy cases cited by the Court are United States v. California, 332
U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950); and United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
94Eyak v. Trawler DianeMarie, 154 F.3d at 1094.
95
Id.
9
6 Id. at 1095.
97Id.
9'Id. at 1096.
"The Constitution allotted to the federal government jurisdiction over foreign commerce,
foreign affairs, and national defense so that as attributes of these external sovereign powers, it has
paramount rights in the contested areas of the sea." Id. at 1096-97.
'" Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
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EYAKNATIVE VILLAGE V. DALEY, 375 F.3D 1218 (9THCIR. 2004) (EN

BANC).

On November 12, 1998, the Villages filed the current suit, asserting
non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in the OCS while
challenging the Secretary's 1993 halibut and sablefish regulations for
IFQ permits.10 1 The Villages prayed for an order requiring the Secretary
to recognize non-exclusive rights arising under aboriginal title by
promulgating a new regulation issuing each native village an IFQ
permit. 102 The United States District Court for the District of Alaska
promptly granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment; the
court dismissed the Villages' claims, holding that the federal
paramountcy doctrine barred claims to aboriginal title as a matter of
law.1 03 The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the district court's
judgment and remanded the case for an initial determination of what
aboriginal rights the Villages possessed.104 Until this point, the Villages
had not been allowed to bring forth evidence in support of their claims to
aboriginal title.
In 2003, while the case was pending, the Secretary relaxed the
regulations for subsistence fishing, but not commercial fishing. 05 The
Secretary promulgated new regulations for Alaska Natives and other
subsistence fishermen, increasing the bag limit to twenty fish per day for
halibut from a single line with thirty hooks throughout a yearlong
season. 06 In light of the new regulations, the Villages argued for
commercial fishing rights, contending that Chugach fishers should obtain
commercial IFQ permits based upon aboriginal title, which included both

101Native Vill. of Eyak v. Locke, No. 3:98-cv-0365-HRH, at 3 (D. Alaska August
7, 2009).
102 Oral Argument at 19:10, Native Vill. of Eyak v.
Blank, 688 F.3d 619 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013).
Responding to a question asked by Judge Pregerson, both the Villages and the Secretary stated the
specific number of IFQ permits owned by a Chugach native is unknown, but the number is "maybe a
handful." Id. at 21:25, 40:40.
103The district court summarily dismissed Count I of the plaintiffs' complaint, which alleged
that the adverse impact of the regulations violated non-exclusive aboriginal rights to hunt, fish, and
exploit the natural resources of the OCS. The courts have ignored Count II, which alleged that the
regulations violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177, because those suits cannot be
brought against a public official. Likewise, the district court summarily dismissed the defendant's
contentions that (1) the statute of limitations to challenge the regulations had passed and (2)
aboriginal rights were extinguished by the Russians. Eyak v. Locke, at 3-4.
10 Eyak v. Daley, 375 F.3d at 1219.
105 Pacific Halibut Fisheries: Subsistence Fishing, 68 Fed. Reg. 18145-01 (April 15, 2003)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 300, 600, and 679).
o See former 50 C.F.R. 301.21.
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commercial and subsistence rights. 0 7 The limited number of IFQ
permits were issued only to vessels that actually caught sablefish or
halibut in the OCS during the years 1988-1991, during which the Exxon
Valdez oil spill annihilated the fisheries. 0 8 IFQ permit requirements
continue to place the Villages at an extreme disadvantage compared to
other commercial fishers within their ancestral fishing waters on the
OCS.
D.

NATIVE VILLAGE OFEYAK V. LOcKE, NO. 3:98-CV-0365-HRH (D.
ALASKA AUGUST 7, 2009).

In 2008, four years after the remand order, the Villages finally had
their proverbial day in court with a weeklong bench trial. Senior District
Judge H. Russel Holland went beyond the remand order 09 and decided
that the federal paramountcy doctrine would still trump non-exclusive
claims.1 0 He concluded as follows, based on his findings of fact:

parties agreed it is possible for Chugach fishers to obtain an IFQ permit, but as Judge
Pregerson noted, the Chugach would need the money to purchase a permit on the market. Oral
Argument at 41:30, Eyak v. Blank. The limited number of IFQ permits issued makes each permit
fairly expensive. As counsel for the Secretary, David C. Shilton, stated, "[The Chugach] can
commercially fish now on the same basis as everyone else." Oral Argument at 41:50, Id. After
purchasing an IFQ permit, expenses would continue to mount because the IFQ standard prices and
fee percentages would apply as revised each year. For the current prices, see Fisheries of the
Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska: North Pacific Halibut and Sablefish Individual Fishing Quota
Reg. 72869 (Dec. 4, 2013) available at
Cost Recovery Programs, 78 Fed.
http://federalregister.gov/a/2013-29023.
1os Trial Brief of Plantiff at 1,Eyak v. Locke, at 26-27.
1 The remand order instructed the district court to "assume that the villages' aboriginal
rights, if any, have not been abrogated by the federal paramountcy doctrine or other federal law."
Eyak v. Daley, 375 F.3d at 1219. Judge Holland stated in his opinion that his "additional
conclusions of law take up and address legal matters that remain pending in this district court and go
beyond the strict limits placed upon the district court by the court of appeals . .. because the mandate
of the Ninth Circuit Court 'vacated' this court's 'judgment.' Without a new judgment, proceedings
in this court will not be concluded as to all issues for purposes of another appeal." Eyak v. Locke, at
25-26.
110
Id. at 24. During oral argument, Secretary's counsel was questioned about Judge
Holland's conclusions of law, because the scope of the remand was limited only to the question of
what rights may exist under aboriginal title. Judge Hawkins stated, "It was Judge Holland's view
prior to the en banc proceedings that irrespective of historical pre-contact use that federal
paramountcy and the application of these statutes we've been talking about meant that the tribes
could never establish aboriginal rights." Oral Argument at 23:56, 51:08, Eyak v. Blank. Counsel was
also asked by Judges Pregerson and Kleinfeld whether the government indeed wrote the conclusions
of law for Judge Holland, to which counsel stated he did not. Oral Argument at 53:00, Id. However,
the Villages did not challenge the district court's findings of fact; those findings were adopted by the
court of appeals, which then engaged in de novo application of the law to those facts. Eyak v. Blank,
688 F.3d at 622.
107Both
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[P]laintiffs' members hunted and fished portions of the OCS at and
before contact with Europeans, but that activity did not give rise to a
nonexclusive, enforceable legal right to hunt and fish the OCS
different from or greater than the rights of all United States citizens. 11
Judge Holland went on to conclude (1) the Villages' aboriginal rights did
not survive upon Alaska's acquisition from Russia; (2) their claims must
be preempted to prevent the regulations from becoming fatally arbitrary;
(3) there are no rights based on custom and prescription; and (4) Indian
Non-Intercourse Act claims cannot be brought against officials of the
U.S. Government.11 2 Judge Holland concluded again that non-exclusive
aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in the OCS are automatically
preempted by the federal paramountcy doctrine." 3
E.

NATIVE VILLAGE OFEYAK V.BLANK, 688 F.3D 619 (9TH CIR. 2012)
(EN BANC) (PER CURIAM).

When the case returned to the Ninth Circuit's en banc panel, the
Villages' claims of aboriginal title were denied by a six to five per
curiam decision issued July 31, 2012.14 The majority affirmed the
ruling of the district court that the Villages had failed to establish
entitlement to non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights to
claimed areas of the OCS." 5 After describing the case and accepting the
unchallenged findings of fact,1 6 the opinion reviewed the Indian claims
law regarding aboriginal title. Under the Sac and Fox test for aboriginal
title, the Villages were required to prove "'actual, exclusive, and
continuous use and occupancy for a long time' of the claimed
area ... measured 'in accordance with the way of life, habits, customs
and usages of the Indians who are its users and occupiers.""
The
majority decided that although the Villages satisfied the continuous use
and occupancy requirements," 8 they "failed to show by a preponderance

i Eyak v. Locke, at 25.
112Id. at 26-27.
3

1 Id. at 27.

114Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619 (2012).
"s id.at 623.

116The majority noted the dissent went on a "fishing expedition through the trial record,"
which is an inappropriate role for an appellate body when the trial court's factual findings are not
challenged. Id. at 622.
11 Id. at 626 (quoting Sac & Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 383 F.2d 991,
998 (Ct. Cl. 1967)).
118Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at
621.
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of evidence that they exercised exclusive control, collectively or
individually, over the areas of the OCS they now claim."" l9
In deciding the Villages did not prove the exclusivity prong of the
test, the majority expanded the test for exclusivity.120 Formerly,
exclusivity was met upon a showing that the tribe asserting aboriginal
title was the dominant force in the region.121 "Exclusivity is established
when a tribe or a group shows that it used and occupied the land to the
exclusion of other Indian groups."1 2 2 The majority relied upon the
phrase "the district court found that other tribes fished and hunted on the
periphery of the Villages' claimed territory."l 2 3 However, permissive
use of a region's resources, unlike abandonment, should not defeat
exclusivity. 124
The majority reasoned that the low population of the Villages
made them incapable of dominating or controlling any area of the
OCS.12 5 The evidence of occasional unity when battling other tribes and
"recognition by the Russians as potentially formidable foes" was not
enough to establish exclusive control.12 6 The majority further stated the
"tribe or group must exercise full dominion and control over the area,
such that it 'possesses the right to expel intruders,' as well as the power
to do so." 2 7 According to the majority, population density becomes the
determinative factor of the exclusivity prong where there is no evidence
of full dominion and control. 28 Thus, the Villages were never numerous
enough to be entitled to rights under aboriginal title.
Relying upon the finding of the district court that on a seasonal
basis "other tribes fished and hunted on the periphery of the Villages'
claimed territory," 29 the majority concluded, by applying the common
119Id. at 622.
120Id.

at 623 ("Use of the OCS alone isn't sufficient to prove exclusive possession.").
evidence contradicting a tribe's domination, the issue turns upon "whether they
availed themselves of their exclusive position." United States v. Seminole Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375,
383 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
122Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 623 (citing United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d
1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975)).
123Id. at 624.
24
1 See Wichita Indian Tribe v. United States, 696 F.2d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
presence of other Indians in a region is not abandonment sufficient to defeat aboriginal title claim).
125Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 624-25.
121Absent

126Id. at 625.

127Id. at 623 (quoting Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, 19 Ind. Cl. Comm. 447, 489
(Ind. Cl. Comm. 1968).
128"The Villages' low population, which was estimated to have been between 400 and 1500,
suggests that the Villages were incapable of controlling any part of the OCS." Eyak v. Blank, 688
F.3d at 624-25.
129Id. at 623.
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usage of the term "peripheral vision," that other groups had exploited
some claimed areas within the OCS, negating the exclusivity prong.'30
Further, the majority held that the low population of the Villages made
them incapable of controlling the claimed areas because they would not
be able to expel an invasion, especially since "the Villages kept all,
including each other, at arm's length."' 3 1 Having found that the Villages
failed to establish aboriginal title, the majority avoided the need to decide
whether aboriginal title would conflict with the federal paramountcy
doctrine.1 32 The case is now viewed as adding a new prerequisite for
establishing aboriginal title-that the tribe must somehow prove the
capability of excluding hypothetical intruders-because a "lack of
evidence other tribes hunting and fishing in the claimed area is not
enough to establish exclusive control," anymore.' 3 3 Accordingly, the
majority decision adds a new element that will be difficult to meet for
tribes claiming aboriginal title. 134
E.

DISSENTING OPINION

Judge Fletcher's dissent explains the flawed analysis of the majority
and incorrect scrutiny applied by the district court. The dissent first
examined the Sac and Fox test, determining the continuous use and
occupancy prong was easily met.13 5 The dissent then reviewed the
caselaw stating what a tribe must prove to meet the exclusivity prong,
and concluded that the Villages need only show they were the sole tribe
continuously using the claimed area.' 3 6 The dissent next reviewed the
district court's factual findings and the majority's fundamental mistakes.
The first fundamental mistake was that the majority used two cases in
which there was evidence other tribes used territory claimed by the tribe

130

Id. at 626.

"' Id. at 623.
132 Id

133Danielle Dellerson, Alaskan Natives' Aboriginal Rights Bid Fails; Villages'
Hunting,

Fishing Use Not 'Exclusive,' U.S.L.W, Aug. 7, 2012.
134
As Judge Pregerson asked, "Who is in a better position to prove non-exclusivity,
the
government or the tribes?" Oral Argument at 33:40, Eyak v. Blank. Nevertheless, the entire
evidentiary burden falls upon the tribe asserting aboriginal title rights.
's Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 626-27 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
36 "In sum, the Sac & Fox test requires that the Chugach show that they used and occupied
the claimed area exclusively. It does not require that the Chugach show that they could have repelled
hypothetical intruders from the area. In the absence of evidence of use by others, the case law
requires only that the Chugach show that they were the only group that used and occupied the area."
Id. at 629-31 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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asserting aboriginal title.137 The second fundamental mistake was the
majority's use of the word "periphery" to mean within the area instead of
at the outer "edge" or "boundary" of an area.138
The dissent in Eyak v. Blank went on to consider the federal
paramountcy controversy for which the Ninth Circuit took up the case.
Although in Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, the Ninth Circuit held that
federal paramountcy bars exclusive fishing rights arising under
aboriginal title, Gambell v. Hodel held that aboriginal rights may exist
concurrently with a paramount federal interest, without undermining that
interest. 139 The dissent in Eyak v. Blank "would reaffirm our holding in
Gambell [v. Hodel] that aboriginal rights may exist on the OCS without
undermining the paramount federal interest." 4 0
The dissent would have remanded the case, instructing the district
court to determine which parts of the claimed areas of the OCS the
Villages had occupied exclusively. The dissent explained that, the
district court had not understood that, in the absence of evidence of use
by other groups within the claimed area, the Chugach could establish
exclusivity simply by showing their own use and occupancy where no
other tribe's use and occupancy existed. "The Chugach did not need to
show that they were able to exclude hypothetical intruders." 1 41
Congruently, the dissent would have instructed the district court to make
findings considering the Chugach as a whole, rather than judging each
village separately.14 2 The dissent would have allowed the district court
discretion to remedy the Secretary's regulations. 143

137The

dissent quoted United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso: "True ownership of land is
called in question where the historical record of the region indicates that it was inhabited,
controlled or wandered over by many tribes and groups." United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso,
513 F.2d 1383, 1394 (Ct. Cl. 1975), quoted in Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 631 (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also cited Osage Nation of Indians v. United States, noting that in that case
"there was evidence of use by other tribes within part of the claimed territory. In that circumstance,
the Osage Nation was required to show it had the ability to exclude those tribes from that part of the
territory." Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 631-32 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (describing Osage Nation of
Indians v. United States, 19 Ind. Cl. Comm. 447, 489-90 (Ind. Cl. Comm. 1968). Here, there was no
such evidence, except for parts of the periphery of the claimed area.
m Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 633 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
1 Compare Native Vill. of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, Inc., 154 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Daley, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999), with People of the
Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1989).
140Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 636 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
141Id. at 636-37 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
142Id. at 637.
143Id.
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III. ARGUMENT
Instead of being at odds with federal paramountcy, aboriginal title
must necessarily be protected by the ultimate sovereignty of the United
States in order for tribes to survive. As domestic dependent nations,
tribes require the protection of federal law in order to continue their
existence and retain any sovereign rights. The majority's conclusions of
law incorrectly require a tribe to prove a nearly impossible condition in
order to establish aboriginal title. The majority should have taken a
liberal approach and viewed the Villages' position historically, rather
than against the present situational backdrop. The dispute over the word
"periphery" evidenced the case's contentiousness. The Ninth Circuit
should have remanded the case for the district court to determine the
extent of territory over which the Villages should be entitled to exert
non-exclusive fishing rights under aboriginal title. Further, these
Villages should have been guaranteed, at the very least, non-exclusive
use of the natural resources of their ancestral fishing grounds claimed via
aboriginal title, because no other tribe claims their waters. The Ninth
Circuit should have restated the United States' commitment to preserving
rights of indigenous peoples. Further, commercial rights arising under
aboriginal title necessitate the Secretary promulgate regulations taking
tribal sovereignty into account.
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOW ABORIGINAL
TITLE EXISTS TO PORTIONS OF THE CLAIMED AREA UNDER
CURRENT LAW; HOWEVER THE MAJORITY OPINION INCORRECTLY
ADDED AN ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT TO BE PROVEN

On appeal, the Villages did not challenge the factual findings of the
district court.144 Instead, they argued that even based on the facts as
found by Judge Holland, they still had proven aboriginal title exists
under applicable precedent.145 The majority failed to correctly apply the
established legal standards used to determine aboriginal rights. Instead,
the majority affirmed the decision of the district court and, in doing so,
literally argued semantics with the dissent. Accordingly, tribes claiming
aboriginal title now must prove not just exclusive possession, but also the
ability to exclude hypothetical intruders, although such evidence seldom
exists. The majority refused to follow the established principle that if

14

Id. at 622 (majority opinion).

145 Id.
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there is no evidence of use or occupancy by any other group, a tribe need
only show it was the only group to use or occupy an area.146
1.

The Common Law ofAboriginal Title that Developed in Orderto
PlaceIndian Tribes in a Unique Situation Should Not Be Judged
According to CurrentSocial Standards

The Chugach proved under current law that aboriginal title exists
at the very least for parts of the claimed areas of the OCS. The Eyak v.
Blank court easily determined that intermittent use of the OCS was
"consistent with the seasonal nature of the ancestors' way of life as
marine hunters and fisherman."' 4 7 However, the majority and dissent
perceived Chugach culture differently when it comes to exclusivity.14 8
Both cited the Sac and Fox standard to measure use and occupancy "in
accordance with the way of life, habits, customs and usages of the
Indians who are its users and occupiers." 4 9
The majority portrayed the Villages as separate and independent
entities, historically isolated to discrete areas of the OCS, who rarely
cooperated and did not use hunting or fishing areas collectively." 0 "The
factual findings do not support a finding of collective use by the entire

146Instead, the majority quoted the district court's finding that "[n]one of the ancestral
villages was in a position to occupy or exercise exclusive control over any part of the OCS on a
sustained basis" and adopted a prevailing land-use presumption: "Areas that are continuously
traversed by other tribes without permission of the claiming tribes cannot be deemed exclusive." Id.
at 624 (citing Wichita Indian Tribe v. United States, 696 F.2d 1378, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The
majority then used the Villages' low population density to suggest the claimed areas of the OCS
would be beyond the Villages' capability to control and concluded that the Villages failed to meet
their burden to show exclusivity, because "[t]here is not enough evidence in the record to persuade
us that the Villages used and occupied the claimed areas to the exclusion of other tribes." Eyak v.
Blank. 688 F.3d at 626. There was no evidence that other tribes continuously traversed the area,
merely that other tribes sporadically used the periphery. As stated by the dissent, "Evidence of use
and occupancy by other groups 'must be specific' to defeat a claim of exclusivity. Evidence of use
by others at the periphery of the claimed territory does not defeat a tribe's exclusivity within the
claimed area." Id. at 628 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
147Id. at 623 (majority opinion).
148
Judge Kleinfeld, who joined the majority, asked whether the only way to find aboriginal
title was to treat the Chugach as "analogous for Europe: if we treated the Danes, the English, the
Germans, and the Swedes as all one people." Oral Argument at 4:20, Eyak v. Blank. Perhaps a more
appropriate analogy, considering that the Chugach share a common history, language, and culture,
would be to consider the Neapolitans, Romans, Venetians, and Florentians as one people: the
Italians. Later, Judge Kleinfeld erroneously concluded "the Chugach [are] a broad designation of a
people, like the European people." Oral Argument at 56:50, Eyak v. Blank.
149Id. at 622 (majority opinion), 627 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (both citing Sac & Fox, 383
F.2d at 998).
"so Id. at 625-26 (majority opinion).
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group of the entire area."'51' The district court found "clear evidence that
at and before contact, villagers could be expected to poach or steal or
raid as often as they sought to visit in a friendly fashion or trade."' 52
Accepting the district court's findings, the majority did not apply thenestablished law. Under established law, in the absence of evidence of
use of the claimed area by other tribes, a tribe could establish aboriginal
title by showing its own use and occupancy.' 53 The majority here
required that the Villages to prove not just the tribe's exclusive use, but
also the tribe's ability to exclude others.
In contrast, the dissent viewed the Chugach as a distinct cultural
group consisting of one tribe, and the dissent thoroughly explained the
proper application of the Sac and Fox standard to the district court's
factual findings.154 The dissent pointed out that there was no finding that
another group used or occupied some area claimed by the Chugach,
although the district court found there was shared use on the periphery,
not within. 1
"[G]eographic features at the periphery of Chugach
territory had place names in more than one native language, but [those]
features within Chugach territory had place names in only the Chugach
language."1 56 As explained by the dissent, aboriginal title is "called into
question only" when other groups wandered, inhabited, or controlled the
claimed area, not determined automatically by such use.' 57
First, the majority opinion, in passing cultural judgment upon the
Villages' use of the OCS, was anthropologically unsound.' 58 Each
151Id. at

626 (emphasis added).
significant rivalries amongst the Chugach villages themselves. They
poached on what were recognized to be the territories of other villages, they raided one another to
steal women or carry on feuds." Native Vill. of Eyak v. Locke, No. 3:98-cv-0365-HRH, at 19 (D.
Alaska August 7, 2009).
1 "The district court found no use or occupancy by others in Chugach territory. Because the
Chugach claim aboriginal rights only in areas where there is no evidence of use by others, it is
sufficient to show exclusivity that they were the only tribe to use and occupy these areas." Eyak v.
Blank, 688 F.3d at 632 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
154Id. at 628-29.
1ss Id. at 630.
152"[T]here were

156 Id

157 Id. at

631 (citing United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941).
1ss For an interesting anthropological prospective on the evidence presented during the trial
phase of this case, see Rita A. Miraglia, Did I Hear That Right? One Anthropologist'sReaction to
Colleague 's Testimony in a Court Case Involving Alaska Native Aboriginal Hunting and Fishing
Rights on the Outer ContinentalShelf 22 INDIGENOUS POL'Y J., no. 4, Spring 2012, available at
http://indigenouspolicy.org/index.php/ipj/article/view/49 (analyzing defense challenge to Chugach
pre-contact cultural identity as a single tribe and attacking evidence used to support assertion that
each village was independent because there was no unified Chugach). The article concluded, "My
problem with some of the testimony presented for the government's case is that unsupported
opinions were presented as fact. In some cases, things that can not be known were presented as being
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Chugach village operated independently. There was no overarching
authority binding the Chugach together. There are still no roads
connecting the Villages. Trade across Prince William Sound coincided
with raids. Raids conducted to acquire property and women were an
accepted custom of the villagers.' 59 Visits between the Villages and
from outsiders were seldom. There is no evidence the Villages ever
attempted to obliterate one another; they merely established violent
rivalries in an environment where survival necessitated such competition.
The Villages to the present day maintain a common language, customs,
diet, and religion. There are common words for locations of the OCS for
the Chugach that no other tribe identifies. The mere fact that the
collective use was competitive, rather than cooperative, does not negate
that the use was exclusive to the Villages. Moreover, because that
competitive use was exclusive to the Villages, and other tribes were
limited to merely the periphery, some rights to continued use should exist
under aboriginal title. This competitive use was the Chugach way of
life.160
Second, the Villages' population density should have weighed in
favor of aboriginal title in this case. The shores of the Gulf of Alaska
encompass a hostile environment limiting population growth. The
resources found there are limited. To this day, Alaska remains one of the
least densely populated states in the United States. To factor in a limited
population and assume that population could not fend off hypothetical
invaders is a logical stretch. Rather than imagine the ability to exclude in
theory, judges should have observed the fact that the fierce Chugach
were not invaded and in fact did not need to exclude other tribes. There
were no armies conquering the area; surrounding tribes had similar

known with absolute certainty." Id. at 16. Contra Christopher B. Wooley, Response to Rita
Miraglia s Did I Hear That Right? One Anthropologist's Reaction to Colleague's Testimony in a
Court Case Involving Alaska Native Aboriginal Hunting and Fishing Rights on the Outer
Continental Shelf 22 INDIGENOUS POL'Y J., no. 4, Spring 2012, available at
indigenouspolicy.org/index.php/ipj/article/view/50/88 (arguing pan-Chugach regional identity is
recent and did not exist before contact).
159"Among the complex societies of the north Pacific rim, women were important war
trophies. For the Chugach of Prince William Sound, warfare was formalized but enemy men were
killed and women and children were captured. There is a great deal of evidence for stealing women
on the Aleut-Alutiiq frontier before the arrival of Russian hunters. The early explorers witnessed
some of the last cases of this in the context of war raids." RICHARD J. CACHON & DAVID H. DYE,
THE TAKING AND DISPLAYING OF HUMAN BODY PARTS AS TROPHIES BY AMERINDIANS 36 (2007).

160Constant tension competing for the limited resources available in a harsh climate created a
culture accepting of certain types of violence, which was both fascinating and shocking to Western
anthropologists in the twentieth century. See generally E. Adamson Hoebel, Law-Ways of the
Primative Eskimos, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 663 (1941); KA BIRKET-SMITH, THE CHUGACH
ESKIMO (1953); WEDNELL H. OSWALT, ALASKAN ESKIMOS (1967).
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population densities and were raided often by the Chugach. It is
outrageous that low population density was the determinative factor in
deciding the Villages could not have asserted exclusive control and could
not defend the area.' 6 1 There is no evidence any other tribe had
encroached upon their territory, except at the periphery. The Villages
continued to control the area after the Russians landed. The Russians
traded for furs, rather than conquer these Villages. They continued
limited control under the United States until commercial enterprises
began exploiting the natural resources. The Villages could not stop the
massive American encroachment, but they should now be allowed to
profit from their ancestral fishing grounds because of aboriginal title.
Third, the fact that other groups did not venture past the boundaries
of the claimed area proves exclusive use. The largest tribe in proximity
was the Tlingit, who respected the Chugach territory enough to limit
themselves to intrusion only upon the periphery. The respected
boundaries evidence the exclusive use of the OCS by the Villages. As
wards of Congress, tribes must receive protection of their recognizable
hunting and fishing grounds with aboriginal title. Thus, until explicit
extinguishment of aboriginal title, the Ninth Circuit should protect claims
of aboriginal title within the boundaries of our nation and allow nonexclusive use to continue where respected tribal boundaries were so
acknowledged.
2.

The Linguistic Dispute Between the Majority and Dissent Evidences
the Semantic Nature of the Denial of Clearly EstablishedAboriginal
Title

The majority and the dissent argued over the use of the word
"periphery" within the district court's findings.1 62 According to the
majority, "periphery" must mean inside the territory, simply because the
most common modem usage of the word is in the phrase "peripheral
vision."' 6 3 This reading did not take into account that only some of the
territory at the boundary claimed by the Chugach was used by other
161Villages' counsel cited United States v. Seminole Indians,
180 Ct. Cl. 375 (Ct. Cl. 1967),
in which the government argued population thinness defeated exclusivity, but the court found that
"2500 people, as many as are probably in a shopping mall on any given day, held aboriginal title to
the entire state of Florida." Oral Argument at 57:45, Eyak v. Blank.
162Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 624; id. at 631-33 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
163"What's in your peripheral vision you can see, not what you can't; the periphery
is

something at the limits of, but within, your vision." Id. at 624 (majority opinion) (citing Webster's
New International Dictionary 1822 (2d ed. 1939). The majority stated, "The dissent's interpretation
of 'periphery' was outdated even in the 1930s . . . as a 'surrounding space; the area lying beyond the
boundaries of a thing. Now Rare.'). Id.
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tribes, while the vast majority of Chugach ancestral waters was
continuously used and occupied solely by the Villages. In its decision,
the majority imputed the occurrences at the borders into the whole of the
claimed territory.
Interpreting the common usage with "peripheral vision" and
applying such an interpretation to judicial findings in such a contested
case should not be the practice of a federal court of appeals. Peripheral
vision is not the same concept as periphery. Periphery was used in this
context to explain the location of trespassers at the boundary of claimed
territory. Further, examining even the common usage of the word as
understood by the majority, would confirm the existence of aboriginal
title. Although objects within one's peripheral vision fall within the line
of sight, those objects still exist only at the boundaries of vision. Objects
seen using peripheral vision are unclear, blurry, and remain at the edge of
sight. These objects do not lie clearly within one's line of sight, or
throughout the field of vision, but exist in a blur at edge of observation.
Thus, even if the Villages could not prove exclusive control at the edge
of the claimed areas of the OCS, they did prove exclusive control of the
vast interior. Even using the majority's interpretation of the word
periphery, aboriginal title exists for all of the areas inside that boundary
of the claimed territory.
As the dissent argued, the use of "periphery" for aboriginal title
claims denotes the edge or boundary of a territory.' 6 4 "The cases clearly.
recognize a distinction between shared use on the periphery of a claimed
territory and shared use inside the territory.... The majority reads
'periphery' to mean not only the edge, but also the interior, of a
territory." 65 Accordingly, the dissent "would reverse and remand with
instructions to the district court to find precisely where within the
claimed area the Chugach have such rights [to aboriginal title]."l 66
Unmentioned by the dissent, the district court's findings did not fully
explain the nature of the concurrent use at the periphery or the
relationships between the Chugach and those other tribes.' 67 Tribes

Id. at 633 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
165Id. (citing Caddo Tribe v. United States, 35 Ind. Cl. Comm. 321, 360-62 (1975); Hualapai
Tribe v. United States, 18 Ind. Cl. Comm. 382, 395 (1967); Zuni Tribe v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct.
607, 608 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1975)).
'" Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 637 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
'6 Judge Holland wrote that travel was too long and dangerous throughout such a large area
that, "[s]uch use and occupancy as probably existed was temporary and seasonal, and more likely
than not was carried out by the residents of individual ancient villages as distinguished from any
kind of joint effort by multiple villages." Native Vill. of Eyak v. Locke, No. 3:98-cv-0365-HRH, at
20-21 (D. Alaska August 7, 2009); Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 625 (majority opinion).
'

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss1/8

28

Howery: Eyak: Aboriginal Rights & Federal Parmountcy

2014]

Eyak: Aboriginal Rights & FederalParamountcy

75

continue to retain aboriginal title to territories where joint and amicable
use and occupancy is found.' 68 Because the district court found other
tribes used only parts of the periphery of the claimed territory, the
Villages should be able to assert non-exclusive rights derived from
aboriginal title to the vast amount of the OCS on the interior of the
claims.
The periphery of the claimed territory here should constitute the
limit of the non-exclusive right to fish. The Ninth Circuit should have
held that, based on the district court's factual findings, the Villages had
non-exclusive rights to the interior of the claimed territory, although not
at the periphery in those locations where other tribes also fished. The
periphery would denote the extent of the Villages' exclusive use.169
Perhaps aboriginal title should extend to that periphery, which is after all,
"the outward bounds of [the claimed area] as distinguished from its
internal regions or center; encompassing limits; confines; borderland." 7 0
B.

THE DISSENT CORRECTLY STATED THE CURRENT LAW REGARDING
FEDERAL PARAMOUNTCY OVER ABORIGINAL TITLE TO FISHING
RIGHTS IN FEDERAL WATERS, A QUESTION ON WHICH THE
DISTRICT COURT RULED INCORRECTLY

Aboriginal title is not pre-empted by the paramountcy doctrine, at
least in regard to natural resources tribes are dependent upon for
survival.' 7 1 The Secretary's regulation of the fishing industry maintains
the existence of a vital natural resource. However, the restrictions placed
upon IFQ permits deny the Villages commercial access to their ancestral
fishing grounds. The Secretary was incorrect in assuming that without
an explicit acknowledgement of rights, federal paramountcy
automatically trumps aboriginal title.172 The Villages assert nonappears the judges here could not fathom the competing consumption of natural
resources as the "collective use by the entire group of the entire area." See id., at 626. An exception
to the exclusivity prong exists where two or more tribes inhabiting the same area can prove "joint
and amicable" possession. Strong v. United States, 518 F.2d 556, 561 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (citing Sac &
Fox Tribe of Indians of Okla. v. United States, 383 F.2d 991, 998 (Ct. Cl. 1967); United States v.
Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
v. United States, 490 F.2d 935 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
69 The periphery debate did not surface during oral argument until rebuttal, when the
Villages' counsel argued that the periphery of the Chugach territory is where the Chugach territory
ends and another tribe's territory begins. Oral Argument at 55.15, Eyak v. Blank.
170Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 624 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
171See People of the Vill. of Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273, 1280 (9th Cir. 1989).
172Judge Fletcher stated the Secretary's argument that the paramountcy doctrine
automatically extinguishes aboriginal rights without any expression by Congress showing an intent
to abrogate, and that those rights do not exist unless explicitly expressed by Congress in a treaty,
168It
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exclusive rights under aboriginal title in order to assert commercial
fishing rights, not subsistence rights. Refusing to acknowledge the
existence of commercial rights under aboriginal title demonstrates the
continuation of an idealistic stereotype. This stereotype of Indian
subsistence must be challenged for these Villages to prosper in the
current, and especially in future, economies.
1.

The SecretaryNecessarily Regulates All Fishing on the OCS as a
Means ofProtectinga Vital NaturalResource ofParamount
Importance

By holding that the Villages did not establish aboriginal title, the
majority avoided the larger question regarding the federal paramountcy
doctrine. 173 "In stark contrast to the states' asserted title against the
federal government in the paramountcy cases, aboriginal rights presume
ultimate federal sovereignty and control." 74 Aboriginal title does not
conflict with federal paramountcy; rights derived from aboriginal title are
necessarily dependent upon federal sovereignty in order to exist. The
Villages sought governmental acknowledgement of their non-exclusive
rights in order to be included in the harvest of the resource they have
always depended upon for survival.
Again, state claims of sovereignty over the federal government in
the paramountcy cases are based upon sovereign state rights over the
federal government. This is not the same as rights claimed under
aboriginal title subservient to the federal government. The Villages do
not assert that regulations should fail to apply to fishers. The Villages
are merely asking to compete in the industry exploiting their ancestral
fishing grounds. By asserting non-exclusive rights, the Villages seek a
piece of the pie, not the entire pastry. Only commercial fishers that
existed for the limited three years stated in the regulation were issued
permits. The Secretary contended that the Villages are now free to
purchase those original permits. However, the Secretary failed to
acknowledge that original permits were not issued to the Villages,
ignoring a commercial right to the natural resources. The Villages
remain at this disadvantage decades following their cleanup efforts

"stands Indian Law on its head." Oral Argument at 45:00, Eyak v. Blank. Affirmation is not needed
to recognize rights that have always existed and have not been destroyed.
173Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 626.
174"Whereas the states sought to establish ownership exclusive of the federal government in
the paramountcy cases, aboriginal rights prevail only against parties other than the federal
government." Id. at 635 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (citing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348
U.S. 272, 279 (1955); Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974)).
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subsequent the Exxon Valdez spill. Although initially seeking to oust
other commercial fishers, the Villages now seek only for a right to
compete. However, the Secretary bars access, and by doing so is
preventing the Villages from profiting from their ancestral fishing
grounds, and instead allows other, established commercial fishing vessels
to do so.
2.

In Order to Equitably Uphold the Sound Reasoning Underlying
Aboriginal Title, Commercial Rights ofIndian Tribes to Ancestral
Fishing Grounds within the OCS Must Be Recognized

It should be the policy of the United States to provide these
impoverished Villages with an avenue of economic activity. The United
States has, as trustee of Indian tribes, has previously asserted treatybased fishing rights to apportion commercial fishing allowances between
Indians and non-Indians over the same waters.175 Although Alaskan
tribes cannot assert sovereignty over any part of that state following
ANCSA, they may claim aboriginal title to lands and seas under the
jurisdiction of the United States.'7 6 As in Gambell v. Hodel, subsistence
rights for the Villages to fish in the OCS in Eyak v. Blank are now
protected, primarily because the Secretary relaxed regulations following
Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie. However, the denial of commercial rights
arising under aboriginal title continues acculturation of native tribes into
a mainstream American citizenry. This is the destruction of the nationto-nation relationship. The majority upheld the district court's decision
to equalize the rights of all United States citizens, rather than
acknowledge the rights of a different entity, the tribe, with a history and
status unlike that of citizens of immigrant descent. In effect, this holding
creates a policy authorizing any agency the United States to assume
complete title of natural resources under its jurisdiction, regulate that
resource, and then sell permission to exploit that resource for commercial
use, regardless of native claims even where rights have never been
abrogated. The use of the natural resources of the OCS should be subject
to the right of native use and occupancy that aboriginal title guarantees.
Instead, tribal litigants must now meet a revised test that effectively

1s See United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding Makah fishing
rights guaranteed by treaty and limiting regulation of fishing to the extent necessary to preserve a
species of fish); see also United States v. Oregon, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that states
may regulate treaty fishing but must use least restrictive alternative to accord tribes fair opportunity
to take portion).
176ANCSA bars claims to aboriginal title within the jurisdictional limits of the State of
Alaska, but it does not implicate federal jurisdiction of the OCS. Gambell v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1273.
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requires them to demonstrate a population large enough to fend off any
hypothetical invasion force summoned by a judge's imagination.1 77
Regulations promulgated under the Magnuson and Halibut acts
exclude the Villages from establishing commercial fishing operations in
the Gulf of Alaska while guaranteeing subsistence rights.178 The Ninth
Circuit thus denied the Villages their rightful commercial opportunity to
fish their ancestral fishing grounds by refusing to declare recognition of
aboriginal title and inclusion into the Secretary's IFQ permit system.
The Secretary did relax regulations for native subsistence fishing.
However, having subsistence rights without commercial rights
guarantees only that Indian tribes retain their "Indianness" and do not
progress with the rest of the nation.17 9 Engaging in commercial activity
while exploiting the resources nature provides was once the hallmark
interaction among America's tribes and with outsiders. It was this trade
that brought the Russians, and then the Americans, to Alaska. This
decision allows the Villages a right to survive, but neither a right to
compete nor a right to prosper. It is difficult to perceive such action as
justice. It seems ironic that by denying recognition of non-exclusive
rights, the Villages are excluded from any commercial use of their
Expanding the requirements for
ancestral fishing grounds.'" 0
use to claim ancestral fishing
of
exclusive
element
the
establishing
grounds relegates aboriginal title to a distant past, making it harder for
tribes to claim rights to natural resources. The future of the Indian is as

1""Indian Law: To properly claim aboriginal fishing rights, a group of Native Americans
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that for the area claimed, the group maintained
exclusive use of the territory and successfully prevented other individuals or groups from exploiting
the benefits of the exclusive territory. Failure to demonstrate a population size reasonably necessary
to enforce the exclusivity, in the absence of other evidence of dominion and control of the claimed
area, will prevent the court from finding that the Native Americans had the necessary exclusive
control of the claimed area." John D. Adams, Summary: Native Village ofEyak v. Blank, Willamette
Law

Online,

WILLAMETTE

UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE

OF

LAW

(2012),

available

at

http://www.willamette.edulwucl/resources/joumals/wlo/9thcir/2012/07/native-village-of-eyak-vblank.html.
1 Interestingly, Warren G. Magnuson, coauthor of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, was defeated in the 1980 U.S. Senate race in the State of
Washington by Slade Gorton, following United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975),
cited supra note 176. Gorton fought for years against treaty-based and aboriginal fishing rights,
characterized Indians as "super-citizens," and used the national platform to promote the abolition of
tribal governments. WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 44, at 238-39.
179See Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's (Re)Construction of

the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REv. 623 (2011) (arguing the Supreme Court uses implicit divestiture
only to remain faithful to the Indian canons of construction to protect tribal rights of traditional
Indian activities, thus keeping all Indians Indian).
i8o Put another way, failure to prove exclusivity excludes the Villages from non-exclusive
commercial activity.
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an ordinary citizen of the United States; a tribe is now just another
minority.
CONCLUSION
"Fish is best rare; language, not so much."'' Most rare is the
granting of a writ of certiorari by the ultimate Court of last resort, yet the
Villages petitioned. These Villages have no tribe because they have been
statutorily transformed into corporations. The people that reside within
these Villages, however, have existed and fished in the claimed part of
the OCS since long before the creation of the United States. The
Chugach should retain non-exclusive rights to fish based on aboriginal
title to their ancestral fishing grounds. Commercial exploitation of all
natural resources must necessarily be limited. However, the businesses
allowed to profit should not have been based upon an arbitrarily
regulated three-year period. Regulation should not deny the descendants
of those who have used a fishery since time immemorial a commercial
share of that very fishery. Aboriginal title was once a sovereign right of
every conquered tribe. This abrogation of Chugach rights will make
future claims for recognition of aboriginal title less likely to succeed.
Gulf of Alaska waters present the best opportunity for these
Villages to develop an industry beneficial to the tribe. The majority
avoided a question of federal paramountcy over tribal rights to natural
resources in the OCS. Had they determined that paramountcy question,
the extent of non-exclusive commercial rights would have been a
contentious issue. The real heart of this dispute was the competing
interests of preserving the fisheries, the means of which restricted access
by awarding a limited number of commercial IFQ permits, and allowing
advancement of the Chugach people by establishing commercial tribal
fishing enterprise. 182
Even accepting the facts as found by the district court, the
Villages proved actual and continuous use and occupancy over parts of
the claimed area for a long time, and exclusive use as measured using
tribal standards, but not under the twenty-first-century standards used by

181
Native Vill. of Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam),
cert. denied sub nom. Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013). With tones reflecting the
voice of the Ninth Circuit's Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, the included pun regarding the use of
different definitions in the English language reflected well the underlying controversy. There was
something about this opinion that smelled fishy, prompting this research, because under our system
of laws, justice, as compared to language, should never be rare.
182"At the heart of this dispute are the competing federal interests of honoring
Native rights
and preserving national fisheries." Eyak v. Blank, 688 F.3d at 621.
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the majority. The Ninth Circuit failed to apply the Sac and Fox test
correctly to the findings of fact finally issued after years of litigation.
Acculturation is complete when the rights of conquered people, once
demanded by humanity, eventually vanish; tribes are now united with
their conquerors as ordinary citizens.
This ruling attacks tribal
sovereignty, purposefully limiting Chugach rights to those of all citizens
of the United States. Unfortunately, in the end, on October 7, 2013, the
Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari,' 83 effectively
affirming the Ninth Circuit decision to expand the requirements for a
showing of exclusive use and occupancy for any native tribe that wishes
to assert claims arising under aboriginal title. The Villages of the
Chugach are denied the right to make a living fishing in their ancestral
fishing grounds based on aboriginal title. The North American
acculturation that began in 1492 is now complete. From the fringe of our
nation, in the frontier State of Alaska, our law now declares that Indians
retain only the rights of every other citizen of the United States of
America; tribal sovereignty and aboriginal title will soon be obsolete
relics from our legal past.
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'This hand drawn map shows the location of the plaintiff Chugach villages between Cook Inlet and the Copper
River Delta along the Gulf of Alaska. Note the location of Middleton Island, to which Chugach from each
village travelled, fishing and hunting along the way. During oral argument, counsel for the Villages, Natalie
A. Landreth, stated, "Middleton Island was visited regularly, probably seasonally... [It] is 60 miles from
shore, and this is a round trip that was so fascinating to the National Parks Service that they undertook a detailed study to figure out ifthis was humanly possible and how people did it.... [T]his took 48 hours, a round
trip of 250 miles," following the tides and ocean currents. Oral Argument at 12:20, 36:30, Native Vill. of Eyak
v. Blank, 688 F.3d 619 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 09-35881) (en banc) (per curiam), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8J3agvV8B5k.

183Native Vill. of Eyak v. Pritzker, 134 S. Ct. 51 (2013).
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